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Vaccination Equity by Design 
Kristen Underhill & Olatunde C.A. Johnson 
 
abstract.  This Essay examines how states’ initial COVID-19 vaccine-distribution strategies 
tended to disadvantage populations of color, including Black, Latinx, and Native American com-
munities. These dynamics resonate with “inverse equity” effects of other public-health innova-
tions. We argue for a federal regulatory framework to reduce inequity-forcing effects during initial 
vaccine rollout. 
introduction 
Racial disparities in COVID-19 exposure, cases, and outcomes have been a 
salient feature of the U.S. pandemic. From its earliest days in 2020, COVID-19 
transmission skyrocketed in Black, Latinx, and Native American communities. 
Members of these populations have been two to three times more likely to be 
hospitalized and more than twice as likely to die from COVID-19 as white, non-
Hispanic people.1 
As 2020 came to an end, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began to 
approve vaccine candidates for emergency use.2 Plans for vaccination rollout 
sparked optimism that the pandemic—and the disproportionate burdens it had 
 
1. See Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(May 26, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-
discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/P8A9-X4B9]. 
2. See FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for 
First COVID-19 Vaccine: Action Follows Thorough Evaluation of Available Safety, Effectiveness, 
and Manufacturing Quality Information by FDA Career Scientists, Input from Independent Experts, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-an-
nouncements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authori-
zation-first-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/3KZC-7YNF] (announcing issuance of emergency-
use authorization for Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine). 
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placed on communities of color—was coming to an end. In the short term, how-
ever, optimism about the equity-promoting effects of COVID-19 vaccination 
was misplaced. In mid-March 2021, surveillance data from forty-four states re-
vealed “a consistent pattern” of lower vaccination rates in communities of color.3 
At the national level, data trends showed much of the same: by July 2021, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that of the fifty-
seven percent of vaccine recipients for whom race was known, sixty-one percent 
were white, fifteen percent were Latinx, and just nine percent were Black.4 For 
Black populations nationwide and in most reporting states,5 rates of vaccination 
during the initial vaccine-rollout period were lower than the rates of adverse ef-
fects from the disease. 
These data were no surprise to public-health scholars of the “inverse equity 
hypothesis.”6 This theory predicts that when health innovations emerge, they are 
initially adopted by wealthy and connected segments of the population, thereby 
amplifying rather than reducing inequality.7 COVID-19 vaccination is a case 
study, characterized by greater uptake in U.S. counties with higher socioeco-
nomic status, lower proportions of racial and ethnic minorities or limited-Eng-
 
3. Nambi Ndugga, Latoya Hill & Samantha Artiga, Latest Data on COVID-19 Vaccinations by 
Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid
-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-race-ethnicity [https://perma.cc
/L4GG-SNBF]. 
4. See COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 30, 2021), https:
//covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccination-demographic [https://perma.cc/CHE3-
98LQ] (reporting raw data on known characteristics of vaccine recipients). Many jurisdic-
tions have only limited data on the distribution of vaccines by recipient race and ethnicity. See 
Elizabeth M. Painter et al., Demographic Characteristics of Persons Vaccinated During the First 
Month of the COVID-19 Vaccination Program, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 174 
(2021), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7005e1.htm [https://perma.cc
/PL8D-CA6J]. But where data exist, they are consistent in showing a disproportionate flow 
of vaccines to white people despite a lower share of COVID-19 cases and deaths in this group. 
Ndugga et al., supra note 3. 
5. Ndugga et al., supra note 3. 
6. Cesar Gomes Victoria, Gary Joseph, Inacio C.M. Silva, Fatima S. Maia, J. Patrick Vaughan, 
Fernando C. Barros & Aluisio J.D. Barros, The Inverse Equity Hypothesis: Analyses of Institutional 
Deliveries, 286 National Surveys, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 464 (2018). For an early application 
of this idea to COVID-19 vaccination, see Adam Todd & Clare Bambra, Learning from Past 
Mistakes? The COVID-19 Vaccine and the Inverse Equity Hypothesis, 31 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 2 
(2021). 
7. Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 464 (“We postulate that new interventions will initially reach 
those of higher socioeconomic status and only later affect the poor.”). 
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lish-proficiency residents, and greater access to quality housing and transporta-
tion.8 These dynamics are part of a familiar pattern, in which socially vulnerable 
communities—particularly communities of color—already carry a larger propor-
tion of illness and death.9 Vaccines are like other health innovations: they ini-
tially widen the gap between the rich and poor. And although these inequality-
exacerbating effects tend to abate once there is near-universal access,10 this is no 
consolation for the communities who experience greater morbidity and mortal-
ity in the meantime. 
The inverse equity effect of COVID-19 vaccination is predictable, but not 
inevitable: early vaccine access depends on the design of distribution systems, 
and these systems can (and should) account for equity concerns early on. Indeed, 
designers of distribution systems like the CDC and state departments of health 
had tools to mitigate inverse equity effects from the beginning of the vaccine-
rollout period. The progress of vaccination in the United States has been com-
plex, with heterogeneous state distribution programs prioritizing equity, includ-
ing racial equity, differently.11 At the federal level, regulatory efforts to promote 
vaccination equity have been incomplete,12 which contributes to the haphazard 
and often belated efforts to expand vaccine access to the racial groups most at 
risk. 
 
8. See Michelle M. Hughes et al., County-Level COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage and Social Vulner-
ability—United States, December 14, 2020-March 1, 2021, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 431 (2021) (reporting vaccination rates by the social vulnerability index, which includes 
poverty rates, income, unemployment, household density, and disability). 
9. There are important qualifications to this racial- and ethnic-disparity data. States collect data 
differently, and a February 2021 analysis found that racial and ethnic data were absent for 
nearly half of those vaccinated. See Rebecca Cooper, Ariella Levisohn & Jill Rosenthal, States 
Identify and Address COVID-19 Vaccine Disparities Through Targeted Rollout and Outreach, NAT’L 
ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.nashp.org/states-identify-and-
address-covid-19-vaccine-disparities-through-targeted-rollout-and-outreach [https://
perma.cc/6DAM-NND4]. 
10. Todd & Bambra, supra note 6. 
11. See State Plans for Vaccinating Their Populations Against COVID-19, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE 
HEALTH POL’Y (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.nashp.org/each-states-plan-for-vaccinating-its-
populations-against-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GGM5-25Z4] (identifying how different 
states prioritized particular populations in each phase of vaccine distribution); Harald 
Schmidt, Rebecca Weintraub, Michelle A. Williams, Kate Miller, Alison Buttenheim, Emily 
Sadecki, Helen Wu, Aditi Doiphode, Neha Nagpal, Lawrence O. Gostin & Angela A. Shen, 
Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccines in the United States, 27 NATURE MED. 1298 (2021) 
(mapping states’ use of different metrics and allocation strategies to promote equity in vaccine 
distribution). 
12. See infra Part II (describing state and federal policy choices in vaccine distribution). 
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In this Essay, we identify policy drivers of racial inequity in early access to 
the COVID-19 vaccine, including health-system infrastructure, physical distri-
bution channels, opt-in and demand-based signups, access to information and 
distribution platforms, and justified medical mistrust. We then offer a regulatory 
framework for addressing inequity in vaccine allocation and distribution. Build-
ing on literature from behavioral economics, public health, and civil rights, this 
Essay advocates for the use of federal regulatory tools to counter inverse equity 
effects from the start of vaccine rollouts. These tools are designed to encourage 
delivery mechanisms involving trusted local organizations, opt-out systems to 
supplement or replace demand-based enrollment strategies, and “targeted uni-
versalism”13 priorities that broaden access to more disadvantaged individuals 
within priority populations. Although state governments take the lead in design-
ing U.S. vaccine-distribution strategies, we prioritize federal regulatory tools be-
cause they have nationwide applicability and have not been used to their fullest 
in the COVID-19 vaccine rollout. 
We focus on vaccine equity on the basis of race and ethnicity in the United 
States. In a pandemic context, equitable or “fair” distribution of vaccines could 
be defined in multiple ways. Most conceptions of equitable distribution suggest 
that vaccine allocation should track the epidemiological burdens of the COVID-
19 disease: vaccines should be distributed in proportions that correspond to each 
community’s COVID-19-related morbidity and mortality.14 In its weekly Mor-
bidity and Mortality reports, the CDC has defined “vaccine equity” along these 
lines: “preferential access and administration to those who have been most af-
fected by COVID-19 disease.”15 This differs from what the CDC has called “vac-
cine equality,” which is characterized by a “similar allocation of vaccine supply 
proportional to . . . [the] population.”16 Other equity concepts—such as anti-
 
13. See John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian & Wendy Ake, Targeted Universalism: Policy & Prac-
tice, HAAS INST. (May 2019), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/targeteduniversalism [https://
perma.cc/9MHC-ARU4]. 
14. See Ndugga et al., supra note 3. 
15. Hughes, supra note 8, at 431. Other commentators have focused on the need to prioritize zip 
codes most affected by COVID-19. See, e.g., Muriel Jean-Jacques & Howard Bauchner, Vaccine 
Distribution—Equity Left Behind?, 325 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 829, 829 (2021); Daniel Salmon, 
Douglas J. Opel, Matthew Z. Dudley, Janesse Brewer & Robert Breiman, Reflections on Gov-
ernance, Communication, and Equity: Challenges and Opportunities in COVID-19 Vaccination, 40 
HEALTH AFFS. 419, 422 (2021); Kai Kupferschmidt, Global Plan Seeks to Promote Vaccine Equity, 
Spread Risks, 369 SCIENCE 489 (2020). 
16. Hughes et al., supra note 8, at 431. Some vaccine-distribution programs have used this defini-
tion instead. Maryland, for example, has proposed using the Vaccine Equity Index to track 
equity, computed as “the percentage of a racial/ethnic group that has received at least a first 
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subordination (avoiding “practices that enforce the inferior social status of his-
torically oppressed groups”17) and anticlassification (avoiding any practices that 
“classify on the basis of race”18)—can provide useful shorthand in discussions of 
vaccine equity, but are less responsive (or unresponsive, in the case of anticlassi-
fication) to the immediate allocation of disease burden.19 We will use “equity” to 
refer to vaccine allocation in proportion to the burden of COVID-19 morbidity 
and mortality, with a particular focus on racial equity.20 
Part I of this Essay introduces the inverse equity hypothesis (IEH) and iden-
tifies patterns in early COVID-19 vaccination that appear to show inverse equity 
effects. Part II examines the factors driving vaccine disparity and shows how key 
design elements of current vaccine-distribution efforts contributed to or failed 
to mitigate inequities, relative to alternative designs. Part III draws on civil 
rights, behavioral economics, and public-health scholarship to propose federal 
regulatory mechanisms to advance equity. 
i .  covid-19 vaccination and the inverse equity 
hypothesis 
The origins of the inverse equity hypothesis lie in a 1971 Lancet article, in 
which British physician Julian Tudor Hart introduced the “inverse care law.”21 
The “inverse care law” captures the idea that, in a market-based system, “the 
availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in 
 
dose divided by the percentage of that racial/ethnic group in the total population.” Andrew 
Maul, Kavitha Reddy & Maulik Joshi, Vaccine Equity Index Showed Reduction in Maryland 
COVID-19 Vaccination Disparity in Less than Two Months, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Apr. 
23, 2021), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/CAT.21.0126 [https://perma.cc/5UWN
-4YUS]. 
17. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional 
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472 (2004). 
18. Id. at 1470. 
19. See, e.g., Govind Persad, Monica E. Peek & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Fairly Prioritizing Groups for 
Access to COVID-19 Vaccines, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1601 (2020) (“[A] misperception is that 
equal concern requires a lottery that gives all recipients identical chances, or chances more 
similar than preventing harm and prioritizing the disadvantaged would require. Lotteries are 
preferable to first-come, first-served or ability-to-pay allocation, which unacceptably exacer-
bate disadvantage. But lotteries are only acceptable when other considerations are approxi-
mately equal, which is vanishingly unlikely with a COVID-19 vaccine.”). 
20. We note here that our concerns and many of our regulatory suggestions may apply well to 
other populations at structural disadvantage in the United States. We focus here on racial 
equity as one dimension of urgent disparities in health-care access and outcomes, and we in-
clude statutes that explicitly target race-based inequities, such as Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. See infra Section III.A. 
21.   Julian Tudor Hart, The Inverse Care Law, 297 LANCET 405, 405 (1971). 
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the population served.”22 Universal health care through the National Health Ser-
vice mitigated but did not eliminate this imbalance.23 Hart’s insight has been 
duplicated across decades, nations, and health-care sectors.24 
The IEH is an unhappy corollary to Hart’s inverse care law. Given inequality 
in the use of existing health-care resources, optimists might hope that new health-
care technologies would be allocated in ways that reduce disparities. But this is 
rarely achieved.25 Studies of innovations as varied as heart surgeries,26 immun-
izations, HIV treatment, dental-cavity prevention, hospital births, vitamin sup-
plements, and safe water have demonstrated that advances in health-care flow 
first to wealthy people, exacerbating rather than reducing disparities.27 
According to the IEH, new interventions amplify inequality in a predictable 
pattern. Early in the diffusion of a new technology, such as a vaccine, wealthy 
people are early adopters.28 As diffusion expands, demand among wealthier and 
middle-income people becomes saturated, while the poorest people slowly begin 
to gain access. Eventually, this delay in access drives persistent disparities to the 
 
22. Id. Hart described variations in all-cause and infant mortality by social class throughout the 
United Kingdom, demonstrating striking disparities favoring wealthier groups. 
23. Michael Marmot, An Inverse Care Law for Our Time, 362 BRIT. MED. J. k3216 (2018); Graham 
Watt, The Inverse Care Law Today, 360 LANCET 252, 252 (2002). 
24. Marmot, supra note 23, at k3216; see also Richard Cookson, Tim Doran, Miqdad Asaria, In-
drani Gupta & Fiorella Parra Mujica, The Inverse Care Law Re-Examined: A Global Perspective, 
397 LANCET 828, 828 (2021) (finding that the inverse care law “persists in almost all low-in-
come and middle-income countries, whereby socially disadvantaged people receive less, and 
lower-quality, health care despite having greater need”). Cookson et al. extend this idea to the 
“disproportionate care law” prevalent in richer countries, in which disadvantaged people may 
receive more care than the wealthy, but that this care is lower quality and insufficient to meet 
poor people’s heightened burden of illness. Cookson et al., supra, at 828-29. 
25. See Cesar G. Victoria, J.P. Vaughan, F.C. Barros, A.C. Silva & E. Tomasi, Explaining Trends in 
Inequalities: Evidence from Brazilian Child Health Studies, 356 LANCET 1093, 1093 (2000). 
26. See Rosemary J. Korda, Mark S. Clements & Jane Dixon, Socioeconomic Inequalities in the Dif-
fusion of Health Technology: Uptake of Coronary Procedures as an Example, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 
224, 224 (2011). 
27. See Victoria et al., supra note 6; see also Cesar G. Victoria, Bridget Fenn, Jennifer Bryce & Betty 
R. Kirkwood, Co-Coverage of Preventive Interventions and Implications for Child-Survival Strat-
egies: Evidence from National Surveys, 366 LANCET 1460, 1460, 1463-64 (2005) (reviewing pri-
mary sources showing the distribution of other innovations mentioned above). 
28. This produces what is called “top inequality,” where the wealthiest gain more rapidly than all 
other groups. Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 464. Some of the more fascinating demonstra-
tions of the inverse equity hypothesis (IEH) are where a health-care practice is initially thought 
to be helpful (and is taken up quickly by the wealthy), but where subsequent research shows 
that it is in fact harmful, such as using C-sections without medical need or refusing the MMR 
vaccine. Id. 
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detriment of the most disadvantaged.29 Vaccines and other innovations thus ag-
gravate inequality when they are first introduced. It is only later, when coverage 
is widespread and the wealthy have extracted their full benefit, that expanding 
access to the innovation can narrow health-status gaps between the rich and the 
poor.30 
In the United States, the health gap between the rich and poor tracks 
longstanding racial disparities in wealth and health care that disadvantage peo-
ple of color.31 Racial disparities in health care reflect not only structural racism 
(e.g., socioeconomic exclusion, unequal insurance availability, residential segre-
gation, inaccessibility of health-care facilities, and exposure to incarceration32), 
but also explicit and implicit racial biases among care providers.33 As applied to 
the United States, the dynamics of the IEH reflect not only rapid demand for 
new innovations among wealthier and whiter patients, but also inadequate sup-
ply of new innovations among patients of color due to institutional and inter-
personal racism, even when socioeconomic status is held constant. 
 
29. Id. at 467 (“[A]bsolute inequalities in population coverage . . . tend to increase as national 
coverage rises to about 50%, and to decline at higher levels of coverage, resulting in an inverted 
U-shaped pattern . . . . [I]nequalities will necessarily be small when national coverage is ei-
ther very low or very high.”); see also John Tayu Lee, Zhilian Huang, Sanjay Basu & Christo-
pher Millett, The Inverse Equity Hypothesis: Does It Apply to Coverage of Cancer Screening in Mid-
dle-Income Countries?, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY CMTY. HEALTH 149, 151 (2015) (finding continued 
lack of access to cancer screening in the poorest quintiles of low-income and middle-income 
countries). 
30. Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 1093 (“We postulate that new interventions will initially reach 
those of higher socioeconomic status and only later affect the poor. This results in an early 
increase in inequity ratios for coverage, morbidity, and mortality indicators, followed later by 
a reduction when the poor gain greater access to the interventions and the rich reach mini-
mum achievable levels for morbidity and mortality, beyond which there are unlikely to be 
substantial further improvements.”). But see, e.g., Martin White, Jean Adams & Peter Hey-
wood, How and Why Do Interventions that Increase Health Overall Widen Inequalities Within 
Populations?, SOC. INEQ. & PUB. HEALTH 65, 75 (Salvatore J. Babones ed., 2009) (criticizing 
the IEH as overbroad and presenting theoretical alternatives). 
31. See, e.g., Zinzi D. Bailey, Nancy Krieger, Madina Agénor, Jasmine Graves, Natalia Linos & 
Mary T. Bassett, Structural Racism and Health Inequities in the USA: Evidence and Interventions, 
389 LANCET 1453 (2017) (describing drivers of structural racism in health-care access); Ruqaii-
jah Yearby, Racial Disparities in Health Status and Access to Healthcare: The Continuation of Ine-
quality in the United States Due to Structural Racism, 77 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1113 (2018). 
32. See Bailey et al., supra note 31 (reviewing pathways between structural racism and adverse 
health outcomes for people of color). 
33. Id. at 1456; William J. Hall, Mimi V. Chapman, Kent M. Lee, Yesenia M. Merino, Tainayah 
W. Thomas, B. Keith Payne, Eugenia Eng, Steven H. Day & Tamera Coyne-Beasley, Implicit 
Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its Influence on Health Care Outcomes: 
A Systematic Review, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 60 (2015). 
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Pre-exposure prophylaxis medication, which prevents HIV infection among 
people who are HIV-negative, provides a case study. Access has lagged among 
Black individuals despite the elevated burden of HIV infection among people of 
color,34 and implicit racial bias likely contributes to this effect.35 Many other 
studies show lagging access among people of color to health-care technologies, 
including cancer screenings,36 seasonal flu vaccination,37 pediatric care,38 and 
organ transplantation.39 
Experiences with racism in health care have also prompted justified mistrust 
among populations of color in the United States,40 particularly given the exploi-
tation of Black people by the medical system since slavery.41 Much of the schol-
arship on medical mistrust cites to awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 
which withheld penicillin from low-income Black men until as late as 1972 in 
order to observe the long-term effects of syphilis infection.42 But medical exploi-
tation and neglect of Black communities long predates the events of Tuskegee, 
and ongoing experiences of discrimination reinforce the view that the health-
 
34. See Bisola O. Ojikutu, Laura M. Bogart, Molly Higgins-Biddle, Sannisha K. Dale, Wanda Al-
len, Tiffany Dominique & Kenneth H. Mayer, Facilitators and Barriers to Pre-Exposure Prophy-
laxis (PrEP) Use Among Black Individuals in the United States: Results from the National Survey 
on HIV in the Black Community, 22 AIDS & BEHAV. 3576 (2018). 
35. Sarah K. Calabrese, Valerie A. Earnshaw, Kristen Underhill, Nathan B. Hansen & John F. 
Dovidio, The Impact of Patient Race on Clinical Decisions Related to Prescribing HIV Pre-Exposure 
Prophylaxis (PrEP), 18 AIDS & BEHAV. 226 (2014). 
36. Arica White, Trevor D. Thompson, Mary C. White, Susan A. Sabatino, Janet de Moor, Paul 
V. Doria-Rose, Ann M. Geiger & Lisa C. Richardson, Cancer Screening Test Use—United States, 
2015, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 201 (2017). 
37. See Anna Rouw, Adam Wexler, Lindsey Dawson, Jennifer Kates & Samantha Artiga, State 
Variation in Seasonal Flu Vaccination: Implications for a COVID-19 Vaccine, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/state-variation-in-
seasonal-flu-vaccination-implications-for-a-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/33GV-
WAMP]. 
38. See Glenn Flores, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Health and Health Care of Children, 125 
PEDIATRICS 979 (2010). 
39. See Rhiannon D. Reed & Jayme E. Locke, Social Determinants of Health: Going Beyond the Basics 
to Explore Racial Disparities in Kidney Transplantation, 104 TRANSPLANTATION 1324 (2020). 
40. See Jessica Jaiswal & Perry N. Halkitis, Towards a More Inclusive and Dynamic Understanding of 
Medical Mistrust Informed by Science, 45 BEHAV. MED. 79 (2019); Kimberly D. Manning, The 
Art of Medicine: More than Medical Mistrust, 396 LANCET 1481 (2020); Lillie D. Williamson, 
Marisa A. Smith & Cabral A. Bigman, Does Discrimination Breed Mistrust?, 24 J. HEALTH 
COMMC’N 791 (2019). 
41. See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2008) 
(documenting centuries of medical exploitation of Black people in the United States). 
42. Id. at 80. 
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care system acts against the health interests of Black people.43 Prior work has 
found that mistrust can cause delays in seeking care and reduced adherence to 
treatment, and that experiences of health-care discrimination can augment this 
mistrust.44 In these ways, justified medical mistrust can present an additional 
access barrier to new health-care technologies among people of color, and it is 
likely to affect vaccination access in the COVID-19 context.45 
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated novel medical interventions, in-
cluding tests, treatments, and vaccines. With many of these innovations, pat-
terns of uptake in the United States and elsewhere have been consistent with the 
IEH.46 In some countries, and on a global scale, this manifests in socioeconomic 
disparities driven by early access for the wealthy, followed by lagging access for 
the most disadvantaged.47 In the United States, the IEH also reflects racial dis-
parities, demonstrated by early access for whiter (and wealthier) communities, 
 
43. Id. 
44. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Legal Battles Against Discrimination in Healthcare, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 167, 172 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William M. 
Sage eds., 2017). 
45. See Hayley S. Thompson et al., Factors Associated with Racial/Ethnic Group-Based Medical Mis-
trust and Perceptions on COVID-19 Vaccine Trial Participation and Vaccine Uptake in the US, 4 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN (May 27, 2021), https://jamanetwork.com/journals
/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2780402 [https://perma.cc/VEX9-M2Q8]. We use the phrase 
“justified medical mistrust” to emphasize that the institutions that create or reinforce mistrust 
should bear the burden of correcting these barriers, rather than the communities that experi-
ence discrimination. See Jaiswal & Halkitis, supra note 40, at 81 (“Medical mistrust, and con-
spiracy beliefs in particular, have been conceptualized as a ‘cultural barrier,’ insinuating that 
such mistrust is a characteristic of populations of color in the United States. This framing is 
problematic and likely racist in that it situates the onus to overcome medical mistrust on the 
population experiencing structural, social, political, and economic exclusion and marginaliza-
tion, rather than the institutions and entities that have created environments that engender 
mistrust and sustain institutionalized inequalities.”). 
46. See Ndugga et al., supra note 3, fig.4 (reporting vaccination by race in the United States from 
March through September 2021, and showing the predictable IEH pattern of initially small 
inequalities at the moment of first rollout, followed by increased disparities between the pro-
portions of white and Black recipients, followed by narrowing disparities in later phases of 
rollout); Anna Rouw, Adam Wexler, Jennifer Kates & Josh Michaud, Tracking Global COVID-
19 Vaccine Equity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. figs.1 & 5 (July 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coro-
navirus-covid-19/issue-brief/tracking-global-covid-19-vaccine-equity [https://perma.cc
/RQ72-QWGT] (demonstrating inequality in vaccine distribution on the basis of country-
level income, with sharp rises in equality driven by high-income country behavior in the 
months after vaccine approval). 
47. This is true in other countries as well as globally. See, e.g., Julien Riou, Radoslaw Panczak, 
Christian L. Althaus, Christoph Junker, Damir Perisa, Katrin Schneider, Nicola G Criscuolo, 
Nicola Low & Matthias Egger, Socioeconomic Position and the COVID-19 Care Cascade from Test-
ing to Mortality in Switzerland: A Population-Based Analysis, LANCET (July 9, 2021), https://
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with lagging access for communities of color. From the start, racial disparities in 
infection have been striking, as have disparities in hospitalization, with people 
of color more likely to be exposed, infected, and hospitalized.48 Among hospital-
ized patients, several U.S. studies have shown no racial disparities in mortality, 
suggesting similar outcomes once patients access hospital care.49 But these find-
ings focus exclusively “on individuals able to access hospital care,”50 and racial 
disparities persist for access to many hospital services.51 
Overall, U.S. data have shown that white individuals have accessed COVID-
19 vaccination at rates that exceed their share of cases, while Black and Latinx 
individuals have been vaccinated at lower rates.52 In the first month of vaccine 
 
www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(21)00160-2/fulltext [https://
perma.cc/8Z49-4EYV]; Julien Riou, Radoslaw Panczak, Christian L. Althaus, Christoph Jun-
ker, Damir Perisa, Katrin Schneider, Nicola G. Criscuolo, Nicola Low & Matthias Egger, So-
cioeconomic Position and the Cascade from SARS-CoV-2 Testing to COVID-19 Morality: Analysis 
of Nationwide Surveillance Data (2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/m75vp 
[https://perma.cc/42F8-AEDQ] (finding disparities in testing based on socioeconomic sta-
tus); Anna Rouw, Adam Wexler, Jennifer Kates & Josh Michaud, Global COVID-19 Vaccine 
Access: A Snapshot of Inequality, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.kff.org
/policy-watch/global-covid-19-vaccine-access-snapshot-of-inequality [https://perma.cc
/V9EY-GLAZ] (documenting access to COVID-19 vaccination on the basis of national in-
come). 
48. Clyde W. Yancy, COVID-19 and African Americans, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1891 (2020); Don 
Bambino Geno Tai, Aditya Shah, Chyke A. Doubeni, Irene G. Sia & Mark L. Wieland, The 
Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Racial and Ethnic Minorities in the United States, 72 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 703 (2021); COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/corona-
virus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html [https://
perma.cc/T86F-VM5W]. 
49. See, e.g., Baligh R. Yehia, Angela Winegar, Richard Fogel, Mohamad Fakih, Allison Otten-
bacher, Christine Jesser, Angelo Bufalino, Ren-Huai Huang & Joseph Cacchione, Association 
of Race with Mortality Among Patients Hospitalized with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
at 92 US Hospitals, 3 J. AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN (2020). 
50. Id. at 8. 
51. See, e.g., Ben Harder, Ronan Corgel & Tavia Binger, Analysis of Racial Gaps in Hospital Care, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 27, 2021), https://health.usnews.com/health-news/blogs
/second-opinion/articles/2021-07-27/analysis-of-racial-gaps-in-hospital-care [https://
perma.cc/Z5EH-5MA3] (describing results of an equity analysis of the publication’s best-
ranked hospitals during 2015-2019; noting that “racial and ethnic minorities are underrepre-
sented among patients who access many common services” at approximately four out of five 
hospitals, and that fewer than one-third of hospitals “treated a proportion of Black patients 
that was comparable to or higher than the proportion of Black residents in the community”). 
52. Ndugga et al., supra note 3. 
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availability, sixty percent of recipients were white, in part due to overall de-
mographics in the prioritized population of health-care personnel.53 But inequi-
table burdens persist within priority populations. For example, among health-
care personnel, a majority of deaths were among people of color, including Black, 
Latinx, and Asian care workers.54 Some studies have documented higher rates of 
vaccine hesitancy among Black populations, linked to justifiable medical mis-
trust.55 However, disparities are present even among people who reported that 
they were willing to be vaccinated,56 which is an important note given many 
other differences between people willing and unwilling to receive the vaccine in 
the United States.57 Racial disparities are one part of overall disparities on the 
basis of social vulnerability and community disadvantage,58 and findings from 
December 2020 through April 2021 show that disparities on the basis of social 
vulnerability increased as vaccine eligibility expanded to include more categories 
of people.59 
These findings are discouraging. But not all health-care diffusion follows the 
inverse equity path. Governments, health-care systems, and providers can roll 
out innovations in ways that deliberately reduce inequality from the earliest 
 
53. Painter et al., supra note 4, at 174. 
54. See Samantha Artiga, Matthew Rae, Olivia Pham, Liz Hamel & Cailey Muñana, COVID-19 
Risks and Impacts Among Health Care Workers by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 11, 
2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/covid-19-risks-im-
pacts-health-care-workers-race-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/KD85-RYMN]; see also Our Key 
Findings About US Healthcare Worker Deaths in the Pandemic’s First Year, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 
2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2020/dec/22/lost-on-the-
frontline-our-findings-to-date [https://perma.cc/SJ89-MP2Z] (finding that nearly sixty-
four percent of health-care worker deaths in the United States were among people of color). 
55. See Lauren Bunch, A Tale of Two Crises: Addressing COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy as Promoting 
Racial Justice, 33 HEC F. 143, 146-49 (2021); Amyn A. Malik, SarahAnn M. McFadden, Jad 
Elharake & Saad B. Omer, Determinants of COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance in the US, 26 ECLIN-
ICAL MED. 100495, 100497-99 (2020). 
56. See Long H. Nguyen et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and 
Uptake (Feb. 28, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
57. See, e.g., Paul L. Reiter, Michael L. Pennell & Mira L. Katz, Acceptability of a COVID-19 Vaccine 
Among Adults in the United States: How Many People Would Get Vaccinated?, 38 VACCINE 6500 
(2020); Cheryl Lin, Pikuei Tu & Leslie M. Beitsch, Confidence and Receptivity for COVID-19 
Vaccines: A Rapid Systematic Review, 9 VACCINES 16 (2021). 
58. See Hughes et al., supra note 8, at 431. 
59. Vaughan Barry et al., Patterns in COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage, by Social Vulnerability and 
Urbanicity, United States, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 818, 818 (2021). 
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stages.60 Researchers have sought to identify the features of health-care innova-
tions that lead to inequality-amplifying initial effects. For example, systems us-
ing voluntary opt-in approaches can increase inequality, as opposed to opt-out 
or mandatory policies.61 This is true for COVID-19 vaccination distribution, 
which requires individuals to actively seek out the vaccine, rather than defaulting 
to vaccination (i.e., requiring opt-outs). In contrast, interventions that specifi-
cally target vulnerable populations—or the use of multiple delivery options—can 
mitigate inverse equity effects.62 These include, for example, offering financial 
incentives, reducing financial or access barriers, or specifically tailoring interven-
tions to disadvantaged groups.63 
COVID-19 has revealed continuing sources of race-based disadvantage in 
access to health-care innovations. We now turn to the distribution choices that 
shaped inverse equity effects in U.S. vaccine distribution. 
i i .  choosing inequitable vaccine distribution 
Key elements of the early design and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines 
contributed to racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in initial access. As 
 
60. Cesar Victoria et al., who originally generated the IEH, have also noted early successes in eq-
uitable distribution of vitamin A treatment for children, HIV treatment, institutional birth 
support, and flu vaccination prioritizing high-mortality populations. Victoria et al., supra note 
6, at 464-65. 
61. See White et al., supra note 30, at 71 (“A common attribute of interventions that lead to in-
creased socio-economic inequalities in health appears to be a reliance on voluntary behaviour 
change.” (citing David Mechanic, Disadvantage, Inequality, and Social Policy, 21 HEALTH AFFS. 
48, 48-59 (2002))). 
62. Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 464-65. 
63. Id. at 469 (offering strategies such as providing free services in needy areas, adjusting some 
interventions to allow for preferred local practices, and planning rollout such that “all inter-
ventions should be initially deployed in the neediest areas”). Financial incentives for individ-
ual vaccine uptake may be part of the solution, but it will not solve access problems more 
generally. See, e.g., Kevin G. Volpp & Carolyn C. Cannuscio, Incentives for Immunity – Strategies 
for Incentivizing Covid-19 Vaccine Uptake, 385 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 381 (2021) (aggregating ex-
amples of state financial-incentives programs for vaccination and emphasizing that “though a 
well-designed incentive program could boost vaccination rates in the short term, there are 
likely to be significant hiccups in implementation”); Rebeca Carmo de Souza Cruz, Leides 
Barroso Azevedo de Moura & Joaquim José Soares Neto, Conditional Cash Transfers and the 
Creation of Equal Opportunities for Health for Children in Low and Middle-Income Countries: A 
Literature Review, 167 INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH 161 (reviewing studies finding that cash finan-
cial incentives can improve childhood vaccination but noting that “cash transfers 
alone . . . may not be able to mitigate poverty and health inequalities in the presence of poor 
health services”). 
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the IEH predicts, as supply of the vaccine has expanded, disparities have nar-
rowed.64 Yet early differences in vaccination meant that illness and hospitaliza-
tion rates remained higher in communities of color and low-income communi-
ties well after vaccines became available. 65  In addition, racial and ethnic 
disparities in vaccination rates have persisted months after the initial authoriza-
tion of the vaccine, particularly as measured against COVID-19 deaths.66 These 
disparities will reverberate beyond the current pandemic because they are missed 
opportunities to strengthen public-health systems and to increase trust within 
underserved communities. 
After emergency-use authorization of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines in late 
2020, federal regulators needed to tackle the difficult logistical, health, and ethi-
cal dimensions of providing access to what was still then a scarce resource. From 
the outset, federal regulators built in equity considerations when planning for 
vaccine rollout. The CDC announced its initial guidelines (developed by its Ad-
visory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP)) in late 2020 and early 2021. 
The ACIP was explicit about its goal of reducing disparities given the extensive 
data on the racial and ethnic distribution of those most affected by COVID-19, 
as well “inequities in social determinants of health that are linked to COVID-19 
risk.”67 Accordingly, an announced goal of the vaccine-allocation framework was 
to reduce and not exacerbate disparities. 68  The guidelines therefore recom-
mended prioritizing access to individuals at high risk because of their age, nature 
of employment, confinement in long-term care facilities, and medical risk.69 Alt-
hough this phasing-in system indirectly prioritized many individuals of color by 
 
64.  See Ndugga et al., supra note 3 (“CDC data also show that recent vaccinations are reaching 
larger shares of Hispanic and Black populations compared to overall vaccinations.”); sources 
cited supra note 46. 
65.  See, e.g., Carla K. Johnson, Olga R. Rodriguez & Angeliki Kastanis, As US COVID-19 Death 
Toll Nears 600,000, Racial Gaps Persist, AP NEWS (June 14, 2021), https://apnews.com/article
/baltimore-california-coronavirus-pandemic-race-and-ethnicity-health-
341950a902affc651dc268dba6d83264 [https://perma.cc/YFZ4-25EV] (reporting in June 
2021—six months after vaccines received authorization—that Black and Latinx populations 
continued to experience greater mortality from COVID-19 compared to other groups, and 
noting lower rates of vaccination as a possible contributing cause). 
66. See Ndugga et al., supra note 3. 
67. Nancy McClung et al., The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ Ethical Principles for 
Allocating Initial Supplies of COVID-19 Vaccine—United States, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WKLY. REP. 1782, 1783 (Nov. 27, 2020) (“Efforts should be made to identify and remove 
obstacles and barriers to receiving COVID-19 vaccine, including limited access to health care 
or residence in rural, hard-to-reach areas.”). 
68. Id. 
69. On December 1, 2020, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP) recom-
mended that health-care personnel and residents of long-term care facilities be offered 
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listing high-risk workers, essential workers,70 and those at high medical risk, the 
guidelines did not explicitly list race, ethnic, or socioeconomic considerations in 
their allocation plans.71 These guidelines were not binding on states, though 
most states used key aspects of the CDC framework in designing their own dis-
tribution systems.72  
Despite this early attention to equity considerations at the federal level and 
in many states, the first phase of vaccine distribution efforts did not avoid the 
inverse equity trap. Instead, ambiguity in the CDC guidance and the initial dis-
tribution decisions made by many states likely contributed to race- and ethnic-
ity-based inverse equity effects. Governments rightly sought to distribute the 
vaccine rapidly, but they missed opportunities to mitigate racial, ethnic, and so-
cioeconomic inequities.73 The tendency by most jurisdictions in the initial dis-
tribution stages to rely heavily on opt-in, demand-based vaccine sign-ups, which 
depended on information and technology infrastructures that were already in-
equitably distributed, was a critical mistake. These systems interacted detrimen-
tally with longstanding disparities in access to health care and technology like 
 
COVID-19 vaccination first, in Phase 1a of the vaccination program. Then, on December 20, 
2020, ACIP recommended that in Phase 1b, the vaccine should be offered to individuals over 
seventy-five years of age, and an expanded set of frontline essential workers. In Phase 1c, in-
dividuals sixty-five to seventy-four years of age, those with high-risk medical conditions, and 
other essential workers should be offered the vaccine. See Kathleen Dooling, Mona Marin, 
Megan Wallace, Nancy McClung, Mary Chamberland, Grace M. Lee, H. Keipp Talbot, José 
R. Romero, Beth P. Bell & Sara E. Oliver, The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ 
Updated Interim Recommendation for Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine—United States, December 
2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1657 (Jan. 1, 2021). 
70.  People of color are overrepresented in essential occupations (frontline industries) in the 
United States; a 2020 analysis found that before the pandemic, Black people constituted 12% 
of all workers but 17% of workers in frontline industries. Hye Jin Rho, Hayley Brown & 
Shawn Fremstad, A Basic Demographic Profile of Workers in Frontline Industries, CTR. FOR ECON. 
& POL’Y RSCH. tbl.1 (Apr. 2020), https://cepr.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-
Frontline-Workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY79-P6M7]. 
71. See Dooling et al., supra note 69. 
72. See id. (describing guidelines as “guidance” and “recommendations” for jurisdictions); State 
Covid-19 Vaccine Priority Populations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.kff
.org/other/state-indicator/state-covid-19-vaccine-priority-populations [https://perma.cc
/5LUZ-MP7T]; see also Dep’t Health, Plan Announced for Next Phase of Covid-19 Vaccine Distri-
bution, R.I. GOV’T (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.ri.gov/press/view/40307 [https://perma.cc
/M8GN-S26Y] (listing states that following ACIP guidance and those instances in which 
states deviated). 
73. See Cooper et al., supra note 9 (noting that federal and state officials sought to balance quick 
vaccination with the need to vaccinate the most vulnerable communities, and that “[s]tate 
officials note that balancing speed and equity is one of the biggest challenges they face”). 
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broadband internet.74 The heavy reliance on online opt-in systems predictably 
increased barriers to accessing the vaccine for communities of color, adding to 
the obstacles already posed by justified mistrust in health-care systems.75 
The remainder of this Part will consider three categories of choices that con-
tributed to inverse equity effects: (A) decisions about the specificity of federal 
regulatory guidance, (B) state and local decisions to use demand-based and 
sometimes resource-intensive sign-up systems, and (C) decisions to centralize 
vaccine distribution in particular geographical locations and institutions. 
A. Gaps in the CDC Guidance  
First, the CDC prioritization guidelines excluded certain high-risk catego-
ries. By relying on broad categories of age, work status, and medical risk for in-
itial prioritization, the guidelines effectively excluded additional ways of meas-
uring social and health vulnerability that might have diminished racial and 
ethnic impact.76 For instance, the initial guidelines chose not to prioritize com-
munities at high risk or who had suffered high rates of COVID-19 infection and 
adverse consequences, many of which were communities of color or low-income 
communities.77 
Subsequently, several states adopted prioritization strategies that diverged 
from the ACIP guidelines. Some states chose to prioritize social vulnerability 
differently: by high-risk neighborhoods in Rhode Island,78 by multigenerational 
 
74. See, e.g., Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewre-
search.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/?menuItem=3109350c-8dba-4b7f-ad52-
a3e976ab8c8f [https://perma.cc/5XHQ-9MV2] (finding persistent racial gaps in access to a 
broadband connection at home, although percentages of adults who say that they use the in-
ternet differed little by race in recent years). 
75. See Hayley S. Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 6-9 (finding that elevated rates of rejection 
of COVID-19 vaccine-trial participation and uptake were attributable in part to group-based 
medical mistrust). 
76. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
77. See id. 
78. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 72 (describing the then-forthcoming Phase 2 shift away 
from occupation to “age, geography, and high-risk conditions”). 
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households in Oregon and Washington,79 and by communities of color (partic-
ularly Native American communities) in Montana.80 By the late winter and early 
spring, as vaccine supply increased, some states targeted particular neighbor-
hoods to reach communities that were most affected by the pandemic, but that 
had lower vaccination rates relative to the general population.81 This response, 
while likely helpful, has made visible the initial design choice not to incorporate 
more direct targeting into early-stage guidelines. 
With more specific guidance, the CDC may have prompted more equitable 
allocation priorities in state vaccination plans. This guidance could have taken 
several forms. One strategy would have been to keep ACIP’s priority categories 
 
79. Id. National data show that households of color are significantly more likely to be multigen-
erational. ACIP provided data showing that Black and Latino individuals over the age of sev-
enty-five were more likely to live in multigenerational households. See Dooling et al., supra 
note 69. 
80. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 72. On April 1, two weeks before vaccinations were open to 
all adults in the state, Vermont indicated that it would prioritize Black, Indigenous, and People 
of Color (BIPOC) communities for receipt of the vaccine. See Phil Galewitz, Vermont to Give 
Minority Residents Vaccine Priority, KHN (Apr. 5, 2021), https://khn.org/news/article/ver-
mont-gives-blacks-and-other-minority-residents-vaccine-priority [https://perma.cc/G4S9-
Q6J6]. The explicit use of race as a sole factor raised some criticism. Vermont’s Race-Base Vac-
cine Policy Raises Legal Questions, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2021), https://www.economist.com
/united-states/2021/04/11/vermonts-race-based-vaccine-policy-raises-legal-questions 
[https://perma.cc/VES8-KZD4]. Below, we suggest a more cautious approach toward con-
sidering race as a factor for outreach and targeting, alongside other indicia of social vulnera-
bility. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
81. See Nambi Ndugga, Samantha Artiga & Olivia Pham, How Are States Addressing Racial Equity 
in COVID-19 Vaccine Efforts?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/ra-
cial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/how-are-states-addressing-racial-equity-in-covid-
19-vaccine-efforts [https://perma.cc/P8ZZ-8DMA] (describing a range of efforts adopted in 
February 2021 to address racial disparities, including opening clinics in high-risk neighbor-
hoods, allowing residents of heavily impacted neighborhoods to have the priority in appoint-
ment scheduling, and establishing partnerships with trusted community-based organiza-
tions). As an example, in March 2021, New York State moved away from exclusive reliance on 
opt-in systems and mass-distribution sites and adopted a range of strategies to address racial 
and socioeconomic inequities in vaccine distribution, including developing “pop-up clinics” 
in low-income and hard-hit communities, partnering with faith-based institutions, and es-
tablishing vaccination centers in public housing projects and senior centers. See Governor 
Cuomo Announces 12 Community-Based Pop-Up Vaccination Sites Coming on Line this Week to 
Vaccinate 4,000 New Yorkers, N.Y. STATE (Mar. 4. 2021), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news
/governor-cuomo-announces-12-community-based-pop-vaccination-sites-coming-line-
week-vaccinate [https://perma.cc/RJJ7-YKCT] (detailing outreach and targeted efforts to 
enhance equity and fairness in vaccine distribution). 
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(e.g., employment categories82), but to further prioritize the hardest-hit com-
munities within those groups—a strategy that might be thought of as “nested” 
priorities. Several public-health researchers advocated for this strategy early 
on,83 based on findings showing racial and ethnic disparities within priority cat-
egories. For example, there has been greater mortality among Black health-care 
workers due to workplace conditions, including the shortage of personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE).84 A subcommittee of the National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) recommended designs that embedded 
priorities even within priority groups—for instance, prioritizing health-care 
workers of color or workers operating in high-risk communities.85 These de-
signs, however, were not specifically recommended by the CDC.86 A survey of 
U.S. adults suggests that most people supported approaches tailored to age, 
mortality risk, and employment, but the survey did not give participants the op-
tion to weigh in on race-based prioritization criteria.87 An allocation mechanism 
that maintains universalist priority groups but also targets vulnerabilities within 
those groups may be publicly acceptable. 
Another more specific strategy—one also recommended by NASEM in re-
sponse to a request from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the CDC 
to develop a vaccine-allocation strategy for the initial stages of short supply88—
 
82. The CDC guidelines suggested that selecting the right employment categories, including oc-
cupations disproportionately held by people of color, could address disparate impact. See 
Dooling et al., supra note 69 (noting that “certain essential worker groups have high propor-
tions of some racial and ethnic minority groups who have experienced disproportionate 
COVID-19 incidence, morbidity, and mortality”). 
83. See Samantha Artiga & Jennifer Kates, Addressing Racial Equity in Vaccine Distribution, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-
brief/addressing-racial-equity-vaccine-distribution [https://perma.cc/2ABR-C6KE]. 
84. See Artiga et al., supra note 54 (showing differential mortality of health-care workers by race). 
85. See Helene D. Gayle & James F. Childress, Race, Racism, and Structural Injustice: Equitable Al-
location and Distribution of Vaccines for the COVID-19, 21 AM. J. BIOETHICS 4-7 (2021) (recom-
mending embedding equity in “each phase of the vaccination process” and recommending 
“when prioritizing vaccination among health care workers, our efforts must specifically avoid 
prioritizing only highly paid physicians and nurses, but also all others involved in patient care, 
such as the other front-line workers who are responsible for transporting patients, providing 
therapies, and other roles that require close contact with patients with COVID-19”). 
86. See Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED. 
(2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK562672/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK562672.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZPB-BJA]. 
87. See Sarah E. Gollust, Brendan Saloner, Robert Hest & Lynn A. Blewett, US Adults’ Preferences 
for Public Allocation of a Vaccine for Coronavirus Disease 2019, J. AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN 
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2770976 
[https://perma.cc/8GLS-6LTD]. 
88. See NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 86, at 2. 
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would have been to allocate vaccine priority based on measures of social vulner-
ability. Elsewhere, the CDC has used the Social Vulnerability Index, a measure 
that has predicted disparities in COVID-19 risk, hospitalization, and death and 
correlates with race-based disparities.89 NASEM agreed with this measure and 
recommended prioritizing geographic areas “identified as vulnerable through 
CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index or another more specific index” for vaccine ac-
cess.90 Some states approximated measures of social vulnerability in other ways. 
Rhode Island, for example, incorporated measures of hospitalization, death, and 
cases to allocate vaccines geographically.91 The state pinpointed these locations, 
and then made vaccines accessible locally via community clinics, housing, and 
pharmacies.92 
In addition to these strategies, the CDC could have prompted more equitable 
vaccine distribution by explicitly invoking race and ethnicity alongside other in-
dicators of vulnerability, using a more targeted approach. The faith that employ-
ment and age-based priority categories would capture the racially disproportion-
ate impact of COVID-19 ignores the lessons of past universalist approaches that 
fail to respond to specific mechanisms of subordination or disadvantage.93 Uni-
 
89. See id. at 8-9. For an investigation of the relationship between social vulnerability and 
COVID-19 deaths, see Sage J. Kim & Wendy Bostwick, Social Vulnerability and Racial Inequal-
ity in Covid-19 Deaths in Chicago, 47 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 509, 509 (2020), which found 
“significant spatial clusters of social vulnerability and risk factors, both of which are signifi-
cantly associated with the increased COVID-19-related death rates.” 
90. NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 86, at 8-9. Some have also advocated for the use 
of the Area Deprivation Index, which uses similar criteria to the Social Vulnerability Index  
but does not explicitly factor in race. Harald Schmidt, Lawrence O. Gostin & Michelle A. Wil-
liams, Opinion, Is It Lawful and Ethnical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?, 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N (Oct. 14, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle
/2771874 [https://perma.cc/YS9M-6X3M]. 
91. Cooper et al., supra note 9. 
92. Id. 
93. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After 
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014) (defining a universalist approach to civil-rights law 
“as one that either guarantees a uniform floor of rights or benefits for all persons or, at least, 
guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a broad group of people not defined according to the 
identity axes (e.g., race, sex) highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws”); id. at 2859 (noting 
that a limitation of universalist approaches is that they “will often address broader problems 
of inequality and injustice only by taking for granted, and indeed entrenching, pre-existing 
group-based inequalities”); Powell et al., supra note 13, at 5, 10 (providing the example of 
Massachusetts’s universal health-insurance programs, which faced an initial exacerbation of 
health-insurance disparities, but advanced a framework of “targeted universalism,” in which 
“universal goals are established for all groups concerned [and the] strategies developed to 
achieve those goals are targeted, based upon how different groups are situated within struc-
tures, culture, and across geographies to obtain the universal goal”). 
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versalist approaches that are nonspecific to race will also miss intersectional cat-
egories of greater vulnerability—including race and disability or health risk, race 
and density, race and place, race and limited English proficiency, and others. 
When many states moved to age-based categorizations, some commentators94 
and state governments realized that these priority groups were not responsive to 
the racial disparities in disease burden.95 
State or federal allocation plans that use race as the sole factor for prioritizing 
access for individuals could draw constitutional challenges.96 And yet, the use of 
formally race-neutral criteria, which ignore the distinct role that race and ethnic-
ity has played in disease burden, risks reinforcing disparities in who has access 
to vaccines, and fails to acknowledge or address vaccine hesitancy linked to jus-
tified medical mistrust and histories of racial exploitation by the U.S. medical 
system. To address this issue, the CDC could explicitly encourage states to attend 
to racial inequities and barriers to access faced by communities of color. This 
approach would encourage states to address the ways in which trust, language, 
insurance, and other factors affect access by people of color. Specific strategies 
should include partnering with neighborhood and nonprofit groups, commu-
nity medical- and social-service providers, or faith-based organizations. As Go-
vind Persad has argued, these community-level strategies that consider the spe-
cific needs of high-risk communities of color are likely to withstand judicial 
scrutiny.97 Given the strong correlation between race and COVID-19 disease 
burden in the United States, issuing CDC guidelines explicitly identifying race 
as one of multiple indicators of increased vulnerability (and therefore priority) 
could prompt states to attend to racial equity as an important aspect of distribu-
tion mechanisms. 
 
94. See Jean-Jacques & Bauchner, supra note 15. 
95. For example, Rhode Island’s guidelines specified, “[d]isparities also exist by race/ethnicity, 
highlighting the importance of a targeted approach that considers underlying factors in com-
munities, such as population density, income, and healthcare access, that create higher risks 
for exposure, hospitalization, and death.” See Dep’t Health, supra note 72. 
96. See Govind Persad, Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1085 
(2021) (identifying legal precedents that may complicate the use of race as an explicit factor 
in vaccine distribution); Michael Conklin, Racial Preferences in COVID-19 Vaccination: Legal 
and Practical Implications, 5 HOW. HUM. & C.R.L. REV. 141 (2021) (considering equal-protec-
tion challenges to vaccination-distribution systems); Schmidt et al., supra note 90 (describing 
strategies for prioritizing racial minority groups in vaccine distribution). 
97. See Persad, supra note 96, at 1097 (arguing that “uses of individual race in medical resource 
allocation are . . . much more vulnerable than, policies aiming to increase vaccine access at the 
community level in minority communities through targeted outreach, delivery of additional 
doses, or geographic priority”). 
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Identifying race would also allow the CDC to make more tailored sugges-
tions to address instances where race gives rise to unique access barriers. For ex-
ample, a universalist approach does not acknowledge or address vaccine hesi-
tancy linked to justified medical mistrust and histories of racial exploitation by 
the U.S. medical system.98 This particular barrier will require access strategies 
that explicitly seek to build trust by partnering with neighborhood and nonprofit 
groups, community medical and social-service providers, or faith-based organi-
zations. A recommendation by the CDC to include race among multiple indica-
tors of vulnerability would prompt states to adopt frameworks that recognize 
and address race-specific barriers to access. 
B. Demand-Based Distribution 
A second key design choice made at the subnational level by many jurisdic-
tions in the initial stages of vaccine distribution was to use opt-in, demand-based 
approaches to distribute vaccine doses. Individuals seeking a vaccine generally 
had to register and find appointments themselves; the default was no vaccina-
tion, and opting in required up-to-date information and access to opt-in sys-
tems. In many jurisdictions, individuals had to schedule appointments using the 
Internet, rather than via telephone or in-person scheduling or registration, or 
walk-in appointments.99 This design choice reflected a balance of important con-
 
98. In March 2021, a Pew Research survey found racial disparities in intent to vaccinate. See Cary 
Funk & Alec Tyson, Growing Share of Americans Say They Plan to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine—or 
Already Have, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2021/03
/05/growing-share-of-americans-say-they-plan-to-get-a-covid-19-vaccine-or-already-have 
[https://perma.cc/9QAS-YKMG] (finding that in November 2020, 83% of Asian-Americans, 
63% of Latinx, 61% of white people, and 42% of Black Americans indicated that they would 
take a COVID-19 vaccine, but that gaps had narrowed with new estimates of 91% of Asian-
Americans, 70% of Latinx people, 69% of white people, and 60% of Black Americans). 
99. See Valerie G. Press, Megan Huisingh-Scheetz & Vineet M. Arora, Inequities in Technology Con-
tribute to Disparities in COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution, JAMA HEALTH F. (Mar. 19, 2021), https:
//jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2777888 [https://perma.cc
/Y6J8-3C3R] (“[V]accine scheduling has predominantly relied on technology such as mobile 
apps and internet portals. Despite ongoing efforts to ensure equity, longstanding systemic 
disparities in technology access and literacy are hindering equitable vaccine distribution and 
raising bigger questions about how technology disparities may be affecting social and health 
disparities.”); Laura Moy & Yael Cannon, How to Build a More Equitable Vaccine Distribution 
Technology, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-
to-build-more-equitable-vaccine-distribution-technology [https://perma.cc/G6RJ-E4MH] 
(noting that “the digital infrastructure used to set up vaccine appointments has created sig-
nificant obstacles for individuals without certain technical resources” and that “[t]he online 
registration processes rolled out state by state are tragically too difficult for most people to 
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siderations, including the need for preregistration to verify compliance with nar-
row eligibility categories, the need to provide formally neutral and transparent 
sign-up systems (e.g., a first-come first-serve system within priority groups), 
and the need to ensure that vaccine registration was not imposed in a way that 
restricted individual autonomy and choice. But in many jurisdictions, this sign-
up system created access barriers for communities of color. 
Many sign-up platforms were complicated for all groups to use, but wealth-
ier and whiter residents had many advantages, including the necessary equip-
ment, broadband infrastructure, knowledge, and time.100 Communities of color, 
low-income communities, and rural communities are less likely to have Internet 
and broadband, putting them at a fundamental disadvantage.101 Even widely 
publicized voluntarist efforts to increase vaccine access through Twitter and 
scheduling bots could not fully address the problem, given that low-income in-
dividuals (and those over the age of sixty-five) are less likely to use social media 
platforms.102 As some researchers have pointed out, the vaccine-rollout process 
was marked by a sad irony: obtaining a vaccine often required access to technol-
ogy, rendering lower-income individuals who lacked the necessary technological 
infrastructure even more vulnerable to COVID-19.103 
Alternative or additional systems such as telephone scheduling, in-person 
scheduling, and the deliberate integration of community partners or health sys-
tems in distribution could have mitigated some of this disadvantage. In the ini-
tial stages of rollout, many jurisdictions did not rely extensively on community-
based organizations or trusted health systems (namely, sources of care that are 
 
handle on their own,” and recommending a range of alternatives including simpler and more 
accessible websites, setting aside appointments for high-risk communities, creating walk-in 
sites in vulnerable communities, and allowing sign-ups by telephone). 
100. See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 9 (recounting that officials in Washington, D.C. noticed 
racial, income, and neighborhood disparities in who was signing up for the vaccine once eli-
gibility was expanded to all those over the age of sixty-five). 
101. See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch
.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband [https://perma.cc/KE3U-7LX2]. 
102. See Sharon Otterman, N.Y.’s Vaccine Websites Weren’t Working. He Built a New One for $50, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/nyregion/vaccine-website-ap-
pointment-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/XUV2-8ZN5] (recounting that free websites and vac-
cine bots that find available appointments diminish scheduling difficulties for those who can 
access, but still require computer literacy). 
103. See Natalie C. Benda, Tiffany C. Veinot, Cynthia J. Sieck & Jessica S. Ancker, Broadband Inter-
net Access Is a Social Determinant of Health!, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (July 8, 2020), https://ajph
.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305784?journalCode=ajph& [https://
perma.cc/MH54-UED4]. 
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less likely to draw medical mistrust, particularly institutions embedded in or op-
erated by local communities, such as neighborhood health centers104) to reach 
out to potential patients to assist with preregistration and appointment schedul-
ing. Essentially, these strategies would shift from opt-in to opt-out distribution, 
and from state- or city-run platforms to platforms run by organizations with 
preexisting credibility and community buy-in.  
C. Centralized (Mass) Distribution 
A third inequality-amplifying strategy was the overreliance by many states 
and localities on centralized vaccination sites for initial vaccine distribution. We 
acknowledge that mass vaccination campaigns can and should be an important 
part of the pandemic response, but we align with commentators who have noted 
that mass vaccination should be carried out with attention to “community ac-
ceptance, accessibility, and equity,” including communicating with community 
leaders, using call centers to address language barriers, and making transporta-
tion and physical access a priority.105 Locating access to COVID-19 vaccination 
in large, centralized sites simplifies and speeds up vaccine administration, but 
also creates distance and travel barriers for at-risk communities, including com-
munities of color.106 Alternative or additional strategies for distribution could 
have mitigated these impacts, as demonstrated by states and localities that 
adopted more decentralized or place-based distribution strategies.107 Decentral-
ized distribution strategies that are sensitive to neighborhood characteristics 
have the dual advantages of reducing logistical access barriers and potentially 
reducing justified medical mistrust. 
 
104. See infra notes 108-111 (detailing the role community health partners might play in decreasing 
vaccine hesitancy). 
105. See Eric Goralnick, Christoph Kaufmann & Atul A. Gawande, Mass Vaccination Sites—An Es-
sential Innovation to Curb the Covid-19 Pandemic, 384 NEW ENG. J. MED e67(1), e67(2) (2021). 
106. See Benjamin Rader, Christina M. Astley, Karla Therese L. Sy, Kara Sewalk, Yulin Hswen, 
John S. Brownstein & Moritz U. G. Kraemer, Geographic Access to United States SARS-CoV-2 
Testing Sites Highlights Healthcare Disparities and May Bias Transmission Estimates, 27 J. TRAVEL 
MED. 1, 1 (2020). 
107. See Maul et al., supra note 16 (describing Maryland’s efforts to decentralize vaccine distribu-
tion by using mobile clinics). Commentators have suggested particular types of organizations, 
retail locations, and geographic locations in vaccine-distribution strategies. See, e.g., Judith A. 
Chevalier, Jason L. Schwartz, Yihua Su & Kevin R. Williams, Distributional Impacts of Retail 
Vaccine Availability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28835, 2021), https://
www.nber.org/papers/w28835 [https://perma.cc/LNT4-ZN84]. 
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Distributing the vaccine through decentralized networks of primary-care 
providers108—such as community health centers or pharmacies—or in collabo-
ration with trusted community partners could have addressed many place-based 
and resource-based access barriers, while simultaneously reducing justified med-
ical mistrust.109 Community partners with high social capital, formal and infor-
mal resources, and social networks—such as housing providers, faith-based or-
ganizations, neighborhood health centers, libraries, pharmacies, and family 
doctors—can play a crucial role in building trust.110 Peer-reviewed literature 
supports these distribution mechanisms; for example, a recent systematic review 
of efforts to reduce vaccine hesitancy has identified logistical and decentralized 
mechanisms that improve uptake of influenza shots and childhood vaccina-
tions.111 “Dialogue-based interventions”—interventions that work with com-
munity and religious leaders, connect with social mobilization efforts, use social 
or mass media, give local care providers communication tools and training, or 
push reminders directly to individuals in at-risk areas—showed particular prom-
ise, as each of these intervention types was found to increase vaccine uptake.112 
Centralized, demand-based distribution systems cannot serve these purposes, 
and many were discontinued as early vaccine demand was satisfied and the dis-
tribution focus shifted to underserved communities.113 
The other advantage of decentralized distribution networks, either alongside 
or in lieu of mass vaccination sites, is that they build capacity. States that initiate 
and strengthen these efforts, particularly actions involving community partners 
and care providers (such as community clinics, pharmacies, and health centers), 
 
108. See Scott Ratzan, Eric C. Schneider, Hilary Hatch & Joseph Cacchione, Missing the Point—
How Primary Care Can Overcome COVID-19 Vaccine “Hesitancy,” 384 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
e100(1), e100(1)-(3) (2021). 
109. Id. 
110.  Partnering with local leadership and trusted community authorities (trusted messengers) can 
build credibility, help tailor messages for local audiences, and develop buy-in. See Emily K. 
Brunson, Alison Buttenheim, Saad Omer & Sandra Crouse Quinn, Strategies for Building Con-
fidence in the COVID-19 Vaccines, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED. 7 (Feb. 2021), https://
www.nap.edu/read/26068/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/6K8B-MQ52]. 
111. Caitlin Jarrett, Rose Wilson, Maureen O’Leary, Elisabeth Eckersberger, Heidi J. Larson & the 
SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy, Strategies for Addressing Vaccine Hesitancy—A 
Systematic Review, 33 VACCINE 4180, 4185-87 (2015). 
112. Id. at 4185. 
113. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, With Mass Vaccination Sites Winding Down, It’s All About the ‘Ground 
Game,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/us/politics/mass-
vaccination-sites-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/3TWJ-RTUL] (describing closing of 
federal- and state-run mass vaccination sites as demand waned and efforts shifted to harder 
to reach populations). 
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will increase the capacity of these networks to deliver other preventive-care in-
terventions (such as influenza vaccinations and testing for current and future 
diseases). These benefits can outlast the immediate crisis and contribute to last-
ing increases in health-care access. 
i i i .  equity by design: regulatory tools to avoid inverse 
equity effects in times of crisis 
The prior Part identified alternatives or additions to the strategies that the 
federal government, states, and localities used to distribute COVID-19 vaccines. 
The omission of these elements has broader implications for strengthening the 
regulatory infrastructure and advancing public-health equity. State and local 
flexibility is essential for a decentralized and tailored approach, given differences 
in disease burdens, variation in available resources, and the legitimate advantage 
to be gained from experimentation across jurisdictions. 
In this Part, we turn to federal law to identify how federal regulators can 
encourage (or mandate) vaccine-allocation strategies that would be most effec-
tive at reducing inverse equity effects. Federal systems have a comparative ad-
vantage in collecting and rapidly analyzing data, publicizing information with 
credibility, disseminating expertise through guidance, enforcing civil-rights vi-
olations, and supporting information networks. In what follows, we suggest a 
mix of hard and soft federal regulatory approaches to avoid inverse equity effects 
from the outset. 
Throughout this Part, we note that traditional regulatory pacing and delib-
eration processes are less appropriate in times of widespread infectious disease. 
Indeed, this is a key reason why emergency statutes temporarily accord greater 
authority to the executive branch, which enables more nimble responses to 
emerging threats. 114  Some scholars have proposed rapid policy evaluations, 
which would be useful for informing future emergency responses.115 As a prac-
tical matter, however, there is very little time to build in an evaluation ex ante in 
times of crisis. As an ethical matter, there may be insufficient equipoise—the 
equal likelihood that a new intervention will help or harm its target population 
compared to the current standard—to use randomized or controlled evaluations. 
And as an administrative matter, it may be difficult (or inadvisable) to supply 
 
114. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Jason W. Sapsin, Stephen P. Teret, Scott Burris, Julie Samia Mair, 
James G. Hodge, Jr & Jon S. Vernick, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 288 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 622 (2002); see also Cali Curley & Peter Stanley Federman, State Executive Orders: 
Nuance in Restrictions, Revealing Suspensions, and Decisions to Enforce, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 623 
(2020) (chronicling executive orders in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
115. Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, 104 
IOWA L. REV. 2313 (2019). 
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different messaging or rules for intervention and control conditions during an 
emergency. 
But other evaluation designs are possible116 and have contributed much to 
the COVID-19 response. We urge federal, state, and local governments to use 
these designs to evaluate the equity outcomes of their responses, including in-
verse equity effects when new preventive or treatment innovations are rolled out. 
We now consider five categories of federal regulatory options that could in-
crease equity from the outset of vaccine rollout, even in times of crisis: (1) 
providing specific guidance regarding equity goals and obligations, (2) provid-
ing default equity plans for state adoption, (3) collecting equity outcome data, 
(4) publicly disseminating and ranking state equity outcomes, and (5) facilitat-
ing information sharing among states. 
The framework we suggest below is well within the power of federal author-
ities. Undoubtedly, the pandemic raised fundamental questions about the role of 
federal, state, local governments in regulating public health. The early days of 
the pandemic were marked by sharp contestations over distribution of PPE, stay-
at-home orders, and mask mandates that implicated federalism and localism. 
And some have argued that the pandemic demonstrates the need for a more cen-
tralized federal authority over public-health emergencies.117 While states have 
police power over public health,118 the specific recommendations below flow 
from the CDC’s and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) 
current statutory and regulatory power over vaccine distribution, interstate dis-
ease transmission, data collection, and the conditioning of federal funds to pro-
hibit discrimination.119 
A. Equity Directives 
Federal systems designers should have attended to race, ethnicity, and social 
vulnerability more explicitly in the initial guidance that they issued to states and 
localities. There are at least two points in the regulatory framework where federal 
agencies might have advanced racial and ethnic equity in the distribution of 
 
116. These alternatives could include pre-post assessments, regression-discontinuity designs, or 
difference-in-difference analyses of jurisdictions that vary due to different states’ policy 
choices. 
117. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally—The U.S. 
Response to COVID-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. e75(1), e75(2)-(3) (2020). 
118. Id. 
119. See, e.g., infra notes 120-122 (detailing agencies’ Title VI authority); see also 42 U.S.C. § 264 
(2018) (stating the Surgeon General’s authority to “make and enforce such regulations 
as . . . are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable 
diseases” from foreign countries or across states). 
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COVID-19 vaccines. First, as suggested in Part II, the CDC’s allocation guidance 
could have recommended that jurisdictions attend to racial and ethnic disparities 
within priority groups, and they could have encouraged jurisdictions to priori-
tize counties or neighborhoods that were socially vulnerable and most affected 
by the pandemic. 
Second, HHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) should have issued clear 
directives under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other relevant civil-
rights statutes to require states to adopt practices that would have promoted eq-
uitable vaccine access.120 Title VI extends to federally funded programs,121 and 
the applicability of Title VI and other civil-rights statutes to funding in health 
care was recently reinforced by the Affordable Care Act.122 Federal assistance for 
the COVID-19 response, including the funds made available to support testing, 
vaccination, and treatment, likely would have qualified as “health program[s] or 
activit[ies],” enabling the DOJ or the HHS Office for Civil Rights to enforce Title 
VI in state COVID-19 vaccination rollouts.123 Title VI also imposes duties of in-
 
120. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018) (prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs). The DOJ is responsible 
for coordinating and implementing federal civil-rights laws “prohibiting discriminatory prac-
tices in Federal programs and programs receiving federal financial assistance.” See Exec. Order 
No. 12250, 28 C.F.R. § 41 (2012). 
121. See, e.g., Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against 
National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/special-topics/limited-
english-proficiency/guidance-federal-financial-assistance-recipients-title-vi/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3ZHA-ULKP]. 
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018) (stating that individuals “shall not, on the ground prohibited 
under [Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, or the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973] be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part 
of which is receiving Federal financial assistance”). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) also ex-
panded the range and number of entities receiving federal financial assistance via large in-
creases in federal spending, such as the advance premium tax credits for marketplace insur-
ance. 
123. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018), and other relevant civil rights laws that prohibit discrim-
ination by recipients of federal funds such as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 794 (2018), and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 
(2018), are also enforceable post hoc in court or by the agency. In the case of Title VI and Title 
IX, the Supreme Court has found that the disparate-impact regulations are only enforceable 
through administrative complaints. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs could not bring private judicial actions to enforce Title VI’s disparate-impact 
regulations). Section 1557 guidance under the Obama Administration attempted to restore 
private rights of action for disparate-impact claims. See Nondiscrimination in Health Pro-
grams & Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,439-440 (May 18, 2016). But some courts declined 
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clusion that go beyond nondiscrimination to require the elimination of unjusti-
fied barriers.124 And in other contexts, federal agencies have used their power 
under Title VI and federal civil-rights statutes to ensure that federal spending 
operates to diminish inequality and promote fair access to federally subsidized 
programs.125 Indeed, HHS issued affirmative inclusionary guidance on the loca-
tion and accessibility of COVID-19-testing sites on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
and language.126 The agency also issued disability guidance requiring accommo-
dation and standards of accessibility in the physical structure, location, and as-
pects of vaccination programs.127 
Similar affirmative guidance from HHS and the DOJ might have directed 
states to avoid COVID-19 vaccine-distribution mechanisms that exacerbate ra-
cial and ethnic inequities, while instructing them on how to improve access. This 
could include advising grant recipients to locate vaccination sites in neighbor-
hoods of color most affected by the pandemic or in decentralized accessible sites 
 
to follow this aspect of the guidance, see, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross Blue Shield of Tenn., 926 F.3d. 
235, 240-41 (2019), and the issue remains unsettled. 
124. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 121 (requiring access to non-English 
speakers); FTA Regulation on Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs of the De-
partment of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 21 (2020) (imposing requirements of nondiscrimi-
nation and proactive inclusion on federal grantees). This duty of inclusion builds on the Title 
VI disparate impact regulations adopted by twenty-six federal agencies. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-
6.204-2(a)(2) to (3) (2020) (GSA); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)-(3) (2020) (HHS regulations pro-
hibiting recipients of federal funds from using “criteria or methods of administration which 
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or na-
tional origin”); see also Title VI Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www
.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual7#103 [https://perma.cc/FL6R-Z9TM] (providing examples 
of agency rulemaking and guidance to inform grant recipients how to avoid adverse disparate 
impacts). 
125. For an account of this phenomenon, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney 
General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2012), which de-
scribes “equality directives” adopted pursuant to Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018), and the 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2018). 
126. See Bulletin: Civil Rights Protections Prohibiting Race, Color and National Origin Discrimination 
During COVID-19; Application of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS. (July 20, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/title-vi-bulletin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DS4T-LCLV] (requiring that grantees ensure that “testing sites are acces-
sible to racial and ethnic minority populations” and specifying that “recipients may consider 
making walk-in testing sites available in urban areas where racial and ethnic minority popu-
lations may not have access to vehicle transportation, or providing home visitation testing in 
rural areas where transportation is a challenge for racial and ethnic minorities”). 
127. See Off. for Civ. Rts., HHS Office for Civil Rights Guidance on Federal Legal Standards Prohibiting 
Disability Discrimination in Covid-19 Vaccination Programs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 
1 (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/federal-legal-standards-prohibit-
ing-disability-discrimination-covid-19-vaccination.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q79X-8HSU]. 
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such as pharmacies or large housing providers, to provide transportation or en-
sure accessibility via public transit, to prioritize residents from particular census 
tracts for sign-ups, to allow walk-in or telephone scheduling as an alternative to 
internet-based registration, to ensure that registration and outreach materials are 
available in multiple languages, and to partner with community groups for out-
reach to particularly hard-to-reach populations.128 
In addition to guiding states and localities in their vaccination plans, federal 
agencies can implement these strategies directly in vaccination centers that are 
federally funded and operated. COVID-19 federal vaccination efforts have in-
cluded a retail pharmacy program and direct provision of vaccine doses and 
funding to community health centers in key areas.129 Numbers released by the 
White House suggest that as of March 2021, federal vaccination sites and feder-
ally funded community health centers provided sixty to sixty-five percent of their 
allocated COVID-19 vaccines to people of color.130 These federal distribution 
programs have been funded by the CDC and by the Health Resources and Ser-
vices Administration (HRSA), another section of HHS.131  Mass vaccination 
programs implemented by the Federal Emergency Management Authority 
(FEMA) have been part of these efforts, and commentators have suggested ways 
to make these programs more equity focused by adjusting allocation processes 
to prioritize underserved groups.132 
 
128. See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text (suggesting specific strategies for increasing 
vaccine equity). 
129. See, e.g., FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Announces Historic $10 Billion Investment to Ex-
pand Access to COVID-19 Vaccines and Build Vaccine Confidence in Hardest-Hit and Highest-Risk 




130. See id. (announcing further investments in federal community health centers); see also Feder-
ally Supported Community Vaccination Centers, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AUTH. (July 6, 2021), 
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support/vaccine-center [https://
perma.cc/NW2M-D4RH] (delineating types of federally run vaccination facilities, including 
distribution at stadiums, hospitals, schools, religious institutions, and mobile vaccination 
centers). 
131. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 129; see also Bureau of Primary Health Care, American Rescue Plan 
Act Awards, HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN. (Apr. 2021), https://bphc.hrsa.gov/program-op-
portunities/american-rescue-plan/awards [https://perma.cc/WT7V-5M6B] (showing allo-
cations of more than $6 billion in funds for health centers serving key populations). 
132. See William F. Parker, Govind Persad & Monica E. Peek, Fair Allocation at COVID-19 Mass 
Vaccination Sites, 2 JAMA HEALTH F. e210464(1), e210464(1) (2021) (proposing four equity-
advancing measures at mass vaccination sites: “(1) preregistration using existing information, 
(2) eligibility rules that recognize the greater burden of COVID-19 in underserved neighbor-
hoods, (3) appointment assignment that prioritizes those with disadvantage, and (4) soci-
oculturally informed outreach to lottery selectees”). 
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B. Default Equity Plans 
One means of inducing states to attend to racial equity is to require them to 
file a vaccine-equity plan with an agency, like the CDC, that employs scientific 
experts with the skills to evaluate such plans and make recommendations. As 
part of the CDC’s response to racial disparities in COVID-19 burdens, the agency 
appointed a Chief Health Equity Officer and began specifically collecting and 
reporting data on COVID-19 outcomes by race and ethnicity.133 The agency did 
not, however, require grant recipients to commit to specific equity-enhancing 
strategies. To enforce such a requirement, Congress could draw on its Spending 
Clause authority to attach conditions to financial assistance, such as federal aid 
to vaccination programs.134 When Congress delegates authority to HHS or the 
CDC to administer state funding, the agency might also possess implied (or ex-
plicit) statutory authority to set application requirements. The congressional 
acts addressing COVID-19135 have allocated more than $67 billion to the CDC 
for its COVID-19 response,136 including more than $20 billion to support the 
distribution and tracking of coronavirus-vaccine distribution.137 The CDC has 
now distributed over $55 billion to states, tribal governments, local govern-
ments, and territories in grants and assistance, including more than $7 billion 
earmarked for vaccination efforts.138 This includes a series of grants specifically 
 
133. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 126. 
134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress can condition federal spending as long as the con-
dition is “germane” to the underlying legislation and the amount of money to which the con-
ditions are attached is not so large as to be unduly “coercive.” See Nat. Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (finding that provisions of the ACA that require states to 
expand Medicaid programs to cover all individuals below the age of 65 with incomes below 
113% of the federal poverty line constituted a “gun to the head” of states, violating the Spend-
ing Clause); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (upholding Congress’s condi-
tioning of 5 of federal-highway funds on states’ raising the drinking age as a “relatively mild 
encouragement”). 
135. See, e.g., Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, 
Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146; Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) 
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care 
Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139, 134 Stat. 620 (2020); Coronavirus Response and Re-
lief Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 114 Stat. 600; American 
Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4. 
136. Budget: Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https:
//www.cdc.gov/budget/fact-sheets/covid-19/index.html [https://perma.cc/DU3D-YU7T]. 
137. Id. 
138. Budget: CDC COVID-19 Funding, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www
.cdc.gov/budget/fact-sheets/covid-19/funding/index.html [https://perma.cc/B6P5-NGBP] 
(showing grant funds per state for COVID-19 purposes, including a breakout for the purpose 
of vaccine preparedness). 
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intended to promote equity, for which “75% of the total funding must focus 
on . . . vaccine access, acceptance, and uptake among racial and ethnic minority 
communities; and 60% must go to support local health departments, commu-
nity-based organizations, and community health centers.”139 If the CDC had re-
quired an equity plan as part of the application or reporting for funding, states 
would have incentives ex ante to build racial equity concerns into their vaccine 
rollout plans. 
We propose, however, that the CDC go further than simply asking for an 
upfront equity plan, and instead propose a default plan that states can choose or 
modify. Although some state-by-state tailoring will be important, the CDC 
could offer states a default equity strategy as a starting point. States could then 
select the parts of the strategy that they wished to pursue or adopt the default 
plan wholesale. The creation of a default plan could save states time as they seek 
federal funds, and ensure that states at least consider implementing strategies 
that promoted equity effectively in the past. This strategy would not entail with-
drawing funds if states departed from their plans. But identifying and publish-
ing states’ equity strategies would ensure that states at least consider equity is-
sues, and it would harness reputational incentives for states to follow through 
with their selected strategies.140 
C. Data Collection 
Data are key to understanding disparities and advancing equity. A core func-
tion of the CDC is to conduct surveillance of infectious diseases at the federal 
level.141 The process of surveillance, however, relies on voluntary participation 
by states. All states require reporting of reportable disease cases, with reportable 
 
139. CDC Awards $3 Billion to Expand COVID-19 Vaccine Programs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/p0407-covid-19-vac-
cine-programs.html [https://perma.cc/NK7E-LGSQ]. 
140. Visible plans can help community-based stakeholders hold states and localities accountable 
for progress. Cf. Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 
DUKE L.J. 1771, 1804 (2017) (describing how nongovernmental groups contribute to the im-
plementation of civil-rights goals by monitoring states and localities and engaging with reg-
ulatory processes). 
141.  See What Is Case Surveillance?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 11, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/9DUY-EWNM] (“CDC 
monitors about 120 of these notifiable diseases and conditions at the national level.”). 
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diseases identified by the state itself.142 Further, the CDC provides states and lo-
calities guidance and resources to aid them in their reporting.143 Where the CDC 
has also designated a particular disease or infection as notifiable,144 states then 
provide these reports voluntarily to the CDC, which collects information via the 
National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System.145 In times of emergency, the 
Public Health Services Act allows the CDC to waive the need for additional ap-
provals to request state information.146 Therefore, although state data reporting 
to the CDC is still voluntary in emergency circumstances, the agency has more 
flexibility in determining what information to request.147 
Congressional responses to COVID-19 have allocated additional funding to 
the CDC to support the agency’s Data Modernization Initiative, an effort to im-
prove disease surveillance in collaboration with state, local, and territorial gov-
ernments.148 The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act 
allocated $500 million to the CDC to improve data infrastructure,149 with par-
ticular efforts to support automated data reporting and electronic transmission 
of data.150 If these systems succeed in streamlining the administrative burdens 
that may deter states from reporting notifiable diseases by race, this will be a 
critical public-health investment for monitoring equity in future pandemics. 
The CDC has also made efforts to use its grant authority to secure improved 
reporting of vaccination data by race and ethnicity. In its 2020 Interim Playbook 
 
142. See id. (“Each state or territory sets local laws and rules for which diseases and conditions 
must be reported.”). 
143. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/docs/NNDSS-Infographic-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4U2-
38HC]. 
144. There are currently about 120 diseases designated as federally notifiable. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(f) (2018). 
147. See Memorandum from Brenda Destro, Deputy Assistant, Sec’y for Plan. & Evaluation on the 
Paperwork Reduction Act Waiver During a Public Health Emergency: Distribution of Trace-
able Opioid Material Kits Across U.S. Laboratories to Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y for Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/Download-
Document?objectID=91342001 [https://perma.cc/8QQ4-3KEB]; see also Public Health Ser-
vice Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944), amended by Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3087, 130 
Stat. 1033, 1147 (2016) (adding § 319(f) to the Public Health Service Act, thereby allowing the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to waive requirements of the Pa-
perwork Reduction Act for voluntary data collection during times of public-health emer-
gency). 
148. Public Health Data Modernization Initiative, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/covid-19/COVID-19-Data-Modernization-Initia-
tive-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2LT-YPES]. 
149. Id. at 1. 
150. Id. at 2. 
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for Jurisdiction Operations for the COVID-19 Vaccination Program, the CDC 
directs funding recipients to “address all requirements outlined in the playbook 
and clearly describe their responsibility for ensuring activities are imple-
mented.”151 In order to receive or administer vaccinations, provider facilities 
supported by CDC funds must enroll in the federal COVID-19 Vaccination Pro-
gram, which requires an agreement to “record and report required information” 
for every vaccine dose administered.152 This required information, in turn, in-
cludes a record of the recipient’s race and ethnicity.153 These types of reporting 
requirements are a useful avenue for collecting race-specific data. Although this 
current arrangement extends only to COVID-19 vaccine distribution in CDC-
funded programs, regulators could use this strategy more broadly to routinely 
mandate demographically disaggregated data on infections and deaths. 
The CDC should routinely request information from states that disaggre-
gates both process and outcome data by race and ethnicity.154 When President 
Biden took office, his administration placed an increased focus on health equity 
with regard to COVID-19. This included establishing a COVID-19 health equity 
taskforce, making recommendations to increase data collection that reflected race 
and ethnicity, and improving responses tailored to the COVID-19 needs and 
challenges of particular populations.155 An additional and clarifying step would 
be for Congress to authorize the CDC to mandate that states report on diseases 
and vaccination explicitly by race or neighborhood, even if the agency could only 
exercise that power during an active public-health crisis. 
D. Dissemination and Ranking Equity Outcomes 
In addition to collecting data on equity-related outcomes, we would also urge 
the CDC to report these data publicly on a state-by-state level, allowing for the 
 
151. COVID-19 Vaccination Program Interim Operational Guidance Jurisdiction Operations, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 2 (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-
managers/downloads/COVID-19-Vaccination-Program-Interim_Playbook.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TPH6-VZ9B]. 
152. Id. at 21. 
153. Id. at 64. 
154. Process data, for example, could include numbers of communities or people reached by out-
reach efforts, while outcome data in this instance would consist of numbers of people receiv-
ing vaccinations. 
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comparison and ranking of states. Multiple metrics could be used to accommo-
date different equity definitions, such as vaccination rates as a proportion of 
overall disease burden, as a proportion of population share, or as a proportion of 
mortality. Disclosures employing these metrics would increase public focus and 
reputational motivations for states to improve the equity outcomes of vaccine 
rollout, and it would give community-based advocates the information needed 
to encourage improvements. At the start of the rollout, a number of states were 
not sharing vaccination data disaggregated by race.156 Efforts to track equity out-
comes relied on private actors such as the Kaiser Family Foundation157 or news 
outlets.158 As of June 2021, however, most states have included race and ethnicity 
information on their public COVID-19 dashboards, though states vary in the 
categories they collect and highlight.159 Routine CDC reporting could encourage 
states to post their own data by race and ethnicity categories, which would in-
crease transparency. The CDC reporting of state data would be highly visible, 
and it would boost the legitimacy, utility, and accuracy of state information. The 
CDC does, in fact, report these data for the United States in aggregate (rather 
than by state or county, at the time of this writing), but it is limited by variability 
and incompleteness in state reporting.160 
 
156. See, e.g., COVID-19 Vaccinations by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2021), https:
//www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/covid-19-vaccinations-by-race-ethnicity [https://
perma.cc/74QG-MV7P] (showing that at least ten states were not reporting vaccination by 
race or ethnicity as of March 1, 2021); see also How States Collect, Report, and Act on COVID-19 
Race and Ethnicity Data, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (July 2, 2021), https://www
.nashp.org/how-states-report-covid-19-data-by-race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc
/W7FX-CXDM] (showing states that report vaccine data disaggregated by race and ethnic-
ity); Caitlin Antonios, Mohar Chatterjee, Georgia Gee, Derek Kravitz, & Kyra Senese, Why 
Some States Won’t Share Race and Ethnicity Data on Vaccinations with the CDC—and Why That’s 
a Problem, COVID TRACKING PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2021), https://covidtracking.com/analysis-up-
dates/why-some-states-wont-share-race-and-ethnicity-data-on-vaccinations-with-the-cdc-
and-why-thats-a-problem [https://perma.cc/EQS4-BTJB]. 
157. Ndugga et al., supra note 3. 
158. 15 States and DC Have Closed at Least Half Their Black Vaccine Gap: Covid-19 Tracker, BLOOM-
BERG (May 26, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-
distribution/us-vaccine-demographics.html [https://perma.cc/9GAG-PBKQ]. 
159. See Emily Zylla, Sydney Bernard & Elizabeth Lukanen, State Health & Value Strategies, Ensur-
ing Equity: State Strategies for Monitoring Covid-19 Vaccination Rates by Race and Other Priority 
Populations, STATE HEALTH & VALUE STRATEGIES (June 3, 2021), https://www.shvs.org/ensur-
ing-equity-state-strategies-for-monitoring-covid-19-vaccination-rates-by-race-and-other-
priority-populations [https://perma.cc/C8SA-BPSE] (“Almost all states (47), with the excep-
tion of Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Wyoming, are now reporting vaccine doses 
administered by race; and 44 states are reporting doses administered by ethnicity. Thirty 
states report information about how the administration of vaccine doses by race and ethnicity 
compares to the state’s underlying population distribution.”). 
160. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 4. 
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This recommendation would be particularly powerful in conjunction with 
state-provided equity plans, as described above. Alongside each state’s equity 
outcomes, the CDC could also post the state’s equity plan. If many states adopt 
similar strategies or select options from the default plan, the agency could check 
off each state’s choices from a list of common strategies. This would facilitate 
comparisons between states, and it would give advocates more insight into the 
types of equity-promoting strategies that states themselves have planned. It may 
also help track which strategies are more effective in promoting equity across 
states, which can inform evaluations and ongoing adjustments. 
Transparency in reporting is necessary, but insufficient. Experimental stud-
ies suggest that adults in the United States are accustomed to racial disparities, 
such that publicizing even gross disparities does not draw sustained engagement 
or public outrage. Worse, it can invite people to rationalize disparities.161 Still, 
even though transparency cannot remedy racial inequity by itself, it is an im-
portant complement to all other equity-promoting strategies. 
E. Facilitating Information Sharing 
Just as the CDC can be a credible hub for vaccine-equity outcome data, it can 
also provide a platform for states and localities to share strategies that may be 
equity promoting (or that turn out to be equity inhibiting). The CDC has long 
run a program identifying “effective behavioral interventions (EBIs)”—pro-
grams that have demonstrated effectiveness for preventing HIV.162 The agency 
actively identifies programs for different population groups, designates them as 
EBIs, and posts information that helps public-health actors identify and adopt 
those programs in practice.163 The agency also provides technical assistance to 
new program implementers.164 
Although the full measure of this approach may not be feasible in pandemic 
times, the CDC can provide web space for states and localities to offer equity-
 
161. See, e.g., Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves: 
Racial Disparities and the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal Justice System, 27 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 183 (2018) (finding that data about racial disparities in the criminal-
justice system often promote stereotypes and justify and rationalize the disparities within that 
system). 
162. Effective Interventions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 5, 2021), https://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/effective-interventions/index.html [https://perma.cc/ST4L-5MKY]. 
163. See id. 
164. See Capacity Building Assistance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/capacity-building-assistance/index.html [https://perma.cc/PK3X
-EUSS]. 
vaccine equity by design 
87 
promoting strategy ideas, create a forum for the public to suggest ways to in-
crease equitable distribution, or facilitate information sharing among states 
(such as through webinars or discussion groups).165 The CDC could publicize 
best or promising vaccine-equity practices for localities, states, and the public, 
similar to the efforts the agency has made to identify evidence-based HIV pre-
vention programs. Encouraging the diffusion of best practices could reduce du-
plicative efforts, increase problem solving, and ultimately promote equitable vac-
cine distribution. 
conclusion 
Improving racial equity in vaccine access is a legal, ethical, and practical ob-
ligation, particularly in a crisis. In this Essay, we have identified the tendency for 
initial vaccine rollout to be inequality-forcing, rather than equity-building, 
drawing on a large body of public-health research documenting the inverse eq-
uity hypothesis. COVID-19 vaccination has fallen into this familiar pattern of 
early access by the wealthy and white, followed by lagging access by people of 
color and the most disadvantaged. We have analyzed ways in which federal 
agency guidance and states’ own choices have contributed to exacerbating vac-
cine inequity, which in turn translates into disparities in COVID-19 disease bur-
den. And we have demonstrated that these choices were not inevitable at the 
outset and are not unchangeable now. Federal regulatory tools are available to 
increase equitable vaccine distribution, many of which leverage existing author-
ities that have gone untapped in the COVID-19 response. 
Our focus in this Essay has been racial and ethnic equity, which is critical 
given the distribution of COVID-19’s burdens. But these strategies can also pro-
mote equity along other axes, such as disability, which is already the subject of 
specific CDC guidance.166 For any underserved group, it would be helpful to 
conceptualize equity as measured by vaccine access in relation to the burden of 
disease, rather than alternatives such as equal lottery chances of vaccination or 
access in relation to population proportion. 
 
165. The CDC is already providing these venues for some COVID-19 issues. See COVID-19 Webi-
nars and Partner Calls, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 17, 2021), https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/communication/videos-webinars-calls.html?Sort
=Date%3A%3Adesc [https://perma.cc/JA3X-RS8Z] (identifying at least twelve CDC-led 
webinars intended for federal and state governmental officials since the start of the pan-
demic). 
166. See Vaccines and Immunizations, Jurisdictions: Vaccinating Older Adults and People with Disabili-
ties, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 14, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/vac-
cines/covid-19/clinical-considerations/older-adults-and-disability/access.html [https://
perma.cc/8XRD-KZAS]. 
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For many of our proposals, an enduring benefit of promoting equitable 
COVID-19 vaccine distribution is the development of systems and capacity to 
deliver health care more equitably in nonpandemic times. Building trust through 
community partnerships, local health infrastructure, transparent reporting, and 
mobile or decentralized vaccine delivery can provide lasting benefits for access to 
other types of health care. 
As COVID-19 and other infectious diseases persist, we will continue to learn 
what works (and what doesn’t) for rolling out new interventions equitably. By 
using regulatory tools and systems designs that build in equity from the start, 
we have a much better chance of mitigating inverse equity effects now and in the 
next crisis. 
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